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The problem of subjectivity – of how to conceptualise the 
subject – remains at the threshold of our understanding of 
human rights, both as a historical construct and a functional, 
juridical technology. Moving away from the idea of liberalism as 
the thought relating to political society based on the juridico-
contractual relation of sovereign to subject, Foucaultʼs account 
of the economic basis for liberal governmentality, developed in 
the series of lectures delivered during 1978 and 1979, provides 
scope to reconsider the problem of subjectivity in human rights. 
Our focus here should be on the possibility of situating the 
constitution of the subject of human rights within the historical 
processes associated with the development of the liberal and 
neo-liberal arts of government, and more specifically at the 
juncture at which the heterogenous forms of subjectivity 
associated with homo juridicus (the subject of rights) and homo 
economicus (the subject of interests) coexist. Further, a critique 
of human rights with this orientation might be used to address 
the fundamental political contradiction inherent in the divided 
subjectivity of the sovereign-subject, and of individual human 
life as the ultimate biopolitical foundation of the state. 
The Problem of Subjectivity and the Governmentality Studies  
The question of the how to conceptualise the subject of human rights is 
among the more difficult and pervasive problems for the human rights 
discourse. Needless to say, it implicates a broader current of philosophical 
critique concerned with the ontological and historical understanding of 
subjectivity, and indeed much of Foucault’s body of work is tied up with this 
concern in one way or another, from the historical analyses on mental 
illness, clinical medicine and delinquency to the study of Greek, Roman and 
Christian ethics. Foucault’s approach to subjectivity takes as its point of 
departure the historicity and finitude of the subject. With this approach, the 
metaphysical presuppositions of the subject reveal themselves in their 
historical and existential specificities, making it possible to better understand 
how the subject has been constituted through knowledge systems and 
institutional and discursive practices. In contrast with the Kantian tradition, 
in which the subject already takes on the form of a moral subject, the bearer 
of a priori moral characteristics, Foucault’s critical genealogical method 
concerns itself with the subject-in-being, the individual who is always in the 
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process of formation. As Deleuze would comment: ‘There’s no subject, but a 
production of subjectivity: subjectivity has to be produced, when its time 
arrives, precisely because there is no subject. The time comes once we’ve 
worked through knowledge and power; it’s that work that forces us to frame 
a new question, it couldn’t have been framed before.’1 This approach, whose 
concern is with subjectification as a process rather than the subject as an 
entity, succeeds in being able to assess the claims to truth associated with 
any particular model of subjectivity at the level of its truth-producing norms 
and mechanisms, to engage in a political problematisation of both the 
epistemological base and the forms of rationality that support the process of 
subjectification.  
Of course, to the extent that in his later work Foucault concentrated on 
subjectivity in terms of the reflective, self-constitutive practices giving form 
to the individual’s identity, there is the vital question of how to 
conceptualise the individual who is the product of such practices – the object 
of self-conscious activity and self-knowledge, the ‘as not yet subject’ that 
serves ‘as point of departure for subjectivation’.2 To frame it from the 
reverse perspective, how should we conceive of the relationship of the 
individual to his self when it is precisely the individual that we cannot know, 
and we cannot know him because he is in the process of being formed at any 
given time through technologies that are always being changed, superseded 
or replaced? This paradox may suggest that from a methodological point of 
view there remains a caesura between the genealogical analyses of the 
subject of power-knowledge (the concern of Foucault’s earlier work) and 
that of the ethical, self-creating subject, a caesura that remains to be 
thoroughly explored. More pertinently, it demonstrates that the constitution 
of the modern subject needs to be explored in its manifold forms at the 
individualised level, with which approach it may not be feasible to reconcile 
one analytics of subjectivity with another. In any case, this conceptual 
difficulty inherent in subjectivity – that of defining the self who is at the 
same time the subject in formation – is at essence the very ontological 
problem of modern human rights. If we examine the relevance of 
governmentality – as a framework within which to determine the conditions 
for the exercise of individual freedom – to the construction of subjectivity in 
human rights, it is with the intention of projecting the problem of 
subjectivity on to a new surface of visibility. 
The genealogy of power that may be traced through the series of 
lectures collated in Society Must Be Defended and Security, Territory, 
Population, and culminating in the dedicated study of liberal 
governmentality in The Birth of Biopolitics, suggests an alternative approach 
to the critique of law and legal institutions, rather than the focus on 
normalising and disciplinary technologies that one finds in Foucault’s earlier 
works. Already with the lectures of Society Must be Defended, Foucault 
moves away from the focused analyses on disciplinary power and traces the 
                                                           
1  Deleuze (1995), pp 113–14. 
2  Han (2002), p 166. 
290 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2010) VOL 19 NO 2 
outline of a new political problematic and corresponding technology of 
power: biopolitics, namely the state’s concern with ‘man-as-living-being’ or 
‘man-as-species’.3 This methodological departure heralds a number of 
significant differences, even if the two technologies of power are not 
mutually exclusive, and indeed in some situations may integrate and modify 
one another.4 First, while disciplinary power assumes the existence only of 
the individual and society, biopolitics is concerned with the population, as 
both a scientific and political problem. Second, it takes into account 
‘collective phenomena which have their economic and political effects’ that 
are relevant and observable only at the mass level and only over a period of 
time. Third, biopolitical mechanisms operate to intervene at the level of 
general phenomena rather than to modify the individual at the level of the 
body.5 In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault introduces the technology 
of ‘security’ as a third approach to the study of power after those of law-
sovereignty and discipline, but as a ‘reactivation and transformation’ of the 
other technologies – ‘a way of making the old armatures of law and 
discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security’.6 Here, 
Foucault develops the notion of security as biopower through an analysis of 
the political transformations associated with the societies of security: from 
pastoral power to the technological assemblage of police within the 
governmental rationality of reason of state. Finally, with the The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Foucault elaborates on the biopolitical foundation of government 
through an analysis of the birth and implementation of political economy 
through liberal and neo-liberal discourses. 
For our purposes, what is singularly important about the latter studies is 
the historical identification of a new mechanism of power that emerged in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, distinguishable both from the 
juridical-political sovereign form and the disciplinary form, whose existence 
marks the critical development of the nation-state. This new mechanism of 
power, beyond merely reacting to the state’s concern for the economic and 
physical welfare of the population, or by virtue of doing so, completely 
reconfigured the structural basis, function and practices of government. Our 
approach, then, might be summarised by the following series of questions. 
If, from the eighteenth century on, a new form of governmental reason 
emerges that operates on a completely different level than the juridical-
political mechanism, that assumes different types of regulation, a different 
rationale for governmental intervention into human lives and ultimately a 
different conception of freedom, how are we to account for the emergence 
and pre-eminence of human rights within the international and national-
constitutional legal discourses, and the consequent development of human 
rights institutions as both part of and in competition with the state? Should 
the two processes be considered to belong to distinct but parallel sets of 
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historical conditions? If so, are there points of convergence, and what 
significance would such convergence have for the genealogical development 
of human rights? In other words, might we be able to situate the phenomena 
of human rights within the historical processes interrogated in the analyses 
on governmentality, and would such a move open up the possibility of new 
critical approaches to the study of human rights that might in turn offer a 
more sophisticated understanding of the construction of modern legal 
subjectivity? 
The Form of Governmental Reason: Reconceptualising the 
Liberal and Neo-Liberal  Discourses 
In order to attempt a preliminary response to these questions, let us first 
extract from the detail of historical findings and hypotheses within the 
lectures the basic theoretical premises underlying the form of governmental 
reason identified by Foucault. In the most generalised sense, this reason 
depends upon and supports a conception of public law – of the regulation of 
public authority – that differs from the juridical approach based on 
fundamental rights. Where the latter proposes the rights of man as the 
deductive starting point from which to establish a sovereign constitution that 
will ensure the limitation of governmentality, the former begins with the 
factual state of governmental practice and determines, from the viewpoints 
of both de facto and desirable limitations, the limits that are consistent with 
the objectives of government.7 In schematic terms, the contrast is between, 
on the one hand, the ‘revolutionary’, juridical approach to the limitation of 
governmental competence, structured around basic rights and public law, 
and on the other hand, the utilitarian, ‘radical’ approach that analyses the 
function of government – in terms of economy, resources and population, 
among other things – and establishes the measures of utility of governmental 
activity.8 Implicated within this schema is the contrast between the juridical 
conception of freedom – the individual’s possession of inherent freedom, 
part of which is ceded to the sovereign – and a conception that views 
freedom in terms of the sphere of independence of the governed with respect 
to government. Where the former revolves around the theory of rights, the 
latter is concerned with the interplay of interests defined by governmental 
utility.9 
At the structural level, the new governmental reason, derived as it is 
from the theory of reason of state, operates in the form of intrinsic 
limitations. That is, rather than limitations being imposed extrinsically 
through the expression of a juridical reason – whether of natural rights, 
revealed scripture or the wills of civic subjects – governmental reason 
reflects limitations that are internal to governmental practice.10 Thus freedom 
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itself becomes an internal, regulatory mechanism, rather than a sanctified 
space from which government carves out the requisite domain of legitimacy. 
As Foucault states, ‘this governmental reason does not divide subjects 
between an absolutely reserved dimension of freedom [from which civil and 
political rights might be derived] and another dimension of submission 
which is either consented to or imposed’.11 The division is made not between 
individuals but within governmental practice itself, in the determination of 
what should and should not be done, of what action is possible for 
government to take. Thus, beyond the question of the legitimacy of 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the natural freedoms of individual subjects, the new 
form of rationality under reason of state is concerned primarily with the 
question of excessive government, and so aims to calculate internally, from 
the principle of its own objectives, the desirable scope of governmental 
practice. 
While it is true that Foucault’s analyses of governmentality sit in 
contrast to the more traditional jurisprudential analyses of the state, it is not 
the case that Foucault has decided to avoid or evade the conceptualisaton of 
the state form; rather, the studies on governmentality suggest alternative 
means of conceptualising the nature and function of the state – after all, as 
the reason of state theorists acknowledged, the state exists as a series of 
phenomena, or more precisely a field of objects, that demands to be 
observed, investigated and understood at the level of its specific operations, 
its ‘specific plurality’.12 In fact, it would be more accurate to say that for the 
theory of reason of state the state is both a given – since one can only govern 
within a structure that already exists – and at the same time that which does 
not yet fully exist, that which must be constructed.13 Thus, reason of state 
presents itself as an approach to the rationalisation of the art of government, 
the governmental reason that aims to produce or develop the state to its 
maximum functional capacity. What is novel in reason of state is the 
theoretical self-sufficiency of the state: without reference to origins, 
foundations or endpoints, the state is conceived as being concerned with its 
own conservation – its maintenance and preservation. It assumes an 
indefinite temporality of government: government always and necessarily 
exists, and thus it is of no consequence from where it derived or whether 
there are external purposes, at least from the perspective of verifying its 
legitimacy. The state then exists as a principle of double, reverse causation, 
by which is meant that the state is the cause of governmental reason – the 
regulatory idea of that governmental ratio – and at the same time functions 
as an objective in this political reason, the construct that emerges from the 
process of the rationalisation of the art of government.14 
Let us now concentrate on the nature of the reality with which 
governmental reason is concerned. According to Foucault, the economic 
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theorists of the eighteenth century reformulated rather than replaced the 
thinking of reason of state. One important manifestation of this 
reformulation was the concern with the naturalness of society, the 
naturalness of the relations between men, of their common existence, which 
may be contrasted with the artificiality of the police state within the doctrine 
of reason of state. The concern with the naturalness of human relations 
within society has certain implications for the nature of governmentality. 
First, if there are natural processes at work in civil society, then it is 
incumbent upon government to understand these processes, to gather 
knowledge on the way in which the population is affected by such things as 
birth and mortality rates, wealth, exchange prices and wages. Thus 
government comes to depend upon a certain scientific knowledge that is able 
to analyse the natural forces that shape the economics and preservation of 
society. Second, knowledge of natural processes must deal with the new 
problem of population – which, as Foucault suggests, is a phenomenon that 
‘appears as a both specific and relative reality: it is relative to wages, to the 
possibilities of work, and to prices’, while it is specific in the sense of having 
its own laws of transformation and movement, and in the fact that it is 
composed of a multiplicity of interests reflecting the spontaneous bond 
between the individual and others, a bond that is not constituted by the 
state.15 Hence there is a different type of governmental practice required, a 
different way of managing the population: whereas the population, when 
conceived as a collection of subjects, would require government in the form 
of rules, regulations and other forms of interdiction, the population 
conceived as a set of natural phenomena necessitates that the state assume 
responsibility in the form of social intervention – intervention through the 
development of social-scientific knowledge and practices bearing upon this 
natural reality. Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, freedom has 
a new role, or perhaps a supplementary function, to play within 
governmentality. While individuals as subjects of political power viewed 
from the perspective of juridical sovereignty may be said to retain freedom 
in the form of fundamental rights against the sovereign, freedom now also 
has an important – indeed integral – part to play within governmentality 
itself. It is a premise of effective government that freedoms be respected 
insofar as the management of the population requires this, not as a principle 
of negative intervention as with the police state, but as a principle of positive 
intervention through institutions and mechanisms that react to the 
naturalness of the set of forces associated with this new conception of the 
population.16  
Needless to say, this supplementary function of freedom, to the extent 
that it reflects a more complex reality – of economic practices and 
population management in addition to the police apparatus – suggests a more 
heterogenous conception of freedom that that associated with the juridical 
paradigm of fundamental rights and the police state. In one sense, it is an 
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infinitely open concept, since it must always adjust to the phenomena of the 
population as it appears at any given moment, while the population 
constantly undergoes change. This marks a stark contrast with the notion of 
freedom under the theory of juridical sovereignty, which is necessarily static, 
perpetually reifying a foundational relation between subject and sovereign. 
In another sense, it nevertheless presupposes the existence of some notion of 
freedom, whether based upon principles of natural law, theological-political 
necessity or social-civic consent, even if the conceptual groundwork for this 
preliminary idea of freedom remains unimportant insofar as the freedom 
integrated within governmentality has a seemingly instrumental existence. 
What is the framework by which freedoms can exist at all, let alone be 
considered fundamental? What is it that renders these fundamental rights 
efficacious from the point of view of the utility of governmental practice? 
We may note here that there is no real discussion within Foucault’s lectures 
of the relationship between these two forms or functions of freedom, and it is 
left for us to take up the thesis on governmentality and further investigate the 
ways in which freedom operates. What is clear, however, is that the implied 
relationship between the two functions of freedom creates a problem with 
respect to the recognition of the subject of rights under this new 
governmental reason. Further, we may tender the hypothesis that it is 
precisely the indeterminacy of freedom that marks the difficulties associated 
with engaging in a critique of human rights. 
In the lectures conducted in early 1979, Foucault attempts a starting 
point for analysing the problem of freedom – more precisely, of multiple 
forms of freedom – as we have formulated it, through a more sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between liberalism and neo-liberalism. In 
his reading of the early, post-war, neo-liberal theorists, an important aspect 
of neo-liberalism is rethinking the relationship between the juridical and 
economic orders, and certainly of the thesis that equates the economic order 
with infrastructure and the juridical-political order with superstructure.17 
Inevitably, the relationship is more convoluted than the instrumental 
hypothesis would allow, with a mutually constitutive set of relations through 
which the economic order provides the imperative for juridical regulation, 
and in turn the juridical order gives form to the economic. Thus they speak 
of an integrated economic-juridical order, with the economy conceived as a 
set of regulated activities, rather than a distinct order that is separate to and 
affected externally by law. 
In fact, liberalism has always dealt with the conjunction of these two 
dimensions – the economic and the juridical – even if in different ways at 
different times. Its concern with the market economy and of the means of 
regulating the spontaneity of economic processes goes hand in hand with its 
interest in the formality of legal interventionism. It is not surprising, then, 
that Foucualt’s analysis of liberal governmentality takes us into an 
examination of the function of the rule of law in liberal theory. The principle 
of the rule of law, as derived from eighteenth and nineteenth century 
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political and legal theorists, is polygenetic, and thus reveals itself to be based 
upon a bundle of concepts and assumptions: that the sovereign rules in 
accordance with law rather than arbitrarily or despotically; that the acts of 
legislative and public authorities are limited by pre-established laws or 
foundational legal principles; that laws create rights by which citizens may 
challenge the legitimacy of the actions of public authorities; and that there 
exists a system of judicial arbitration – which, at least according to the 
English position, would not be merely administrative courts organised by the 
state, but the ordinary courts of justice – through which individuals may 
obtain a legal remedy against the state. What, then, is the significance of the 
rule of law for the economic order? 
From Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, Foucault extracts the 
defining features of the function of the rule of law, the principles justifying 
legal intervention in economic processes.18 Under the rule of law, law must 
intervene in a purely formal way: it establishes the possibility of adopting 
certain measures but does not actually determine those measures – that is, it 
does not engage in economic deliberation and choice, but merely sets up the 
legal arrangement through which economic choices may be put into effect. 
As a corollary, law ‘must be conceived a priori in the form of fixed rules 
and must never be rectifiable by reference to the effects produced’.19 It 
establishes the framework within which economic agents may make 
decisions freely, complemented by directing the behaviour of public 
authorities so that everyone may know in advance how the state may react. 
As a consequence of these features, the rule of law ensures that the state has 
no overriding knowledge of the economic processes, such that the economy 
appears as a game for both the state and its citizens. In short, law under the 
principle of the rule of law provides the requisite juridical-institutional 
framework to govern the spontaneous processes within the economic order 
rather than any form of economic and social control. This includes the 
development of judicial institutions and procedures that are capable of 
dealing with instances of conflict created by the spontaneous nature of 
economic regulation.20 Of course, the need for arbitration derived from the 
multiplicity of types of conflicts that emerge where enterprise itself remains 
unregulated is an enduring problem for liberalism – it is a problem that 
largely dominates the liberal discourse on the correct institutional balance 
for this economic-juridical order. 
In some respects, this problem appears more patent in the basic 
theoretical premises of American liberalism because, as Foucault points out, 
from its inception ‘liberalism was appealed to as the founding and 
legitimising principle of the state’, crucial to the political debates on 
independence, unity and the rule of law.21 In comparison with European 
liberalism, in which liberal governmentality reacted to the already 
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established reason of state, American liberalism propounded a theory of the 
state – of the relationship between the individual and government – 
explicitly formulated in terms of the juridical conception of freedom. For the 
American neo-liberals, it was a natural movement to approach the question 
of economic interventionism from the perspective of human capital (the 
economic analysis of labour) and the problem of individual criminality (the 
economics of penal justice), both of which are concerned with the function 
of freedom in the citizen–government relationship. 
Neo-liberalism emerges through the imperative of intervention, both 
economic and legal, which results from the fact that the true economic 
subject is neither the man of exchange nor the consumer, but the man of 
enterprise and producer:22 he is his own capital and the producer of his own 
satisfaction.23 This is to say that, for neo-liberalism – and this marks a shift 
from the classical liberal model in which economics is concerned with the 
mechanisms of production and exchange and the calculation of consumption 
– economics is instead concerned with human activity; its task is to analyse a 
form of human behaviour and its internal rationality. Thus the neo-liberal 
economic analysis of labour is in terms of the worker not simply as an object 
of supply and demand, where labour represents a mere cog in the processes 
of capital and production, but as a subject whose work, conduct, calculation 
of interests and choices may be assessed at the level of strategies or modes 
of rationality. The individual’s ability to make choices on the allocation of 
scarce means to alternative ends establishes the individual as an active 
economic subject, and permits the reorientation of the analysis of homo 
economicus towards the notion of human capital, as that income-producing 
capacity that inheres in the individual.24 As Colin Gordon aptly summarises: 
‘It becomes the ambition of neo-liberalism to implicate the individual 
citizen, as player and partner, into this market game.’25 
The dynamics of free economic subjects, who interact within a social 
field in which irregularities and conflicts surface in the vast space left by the 
‘de-functionarization of the economic action of plans’, necessitate 
intervention by the state.26 In the first place, where the classical liberal notion 
of competition as a natural, spontaneous phenomenon gives way to a notion 
of competition as a principle of formalisation, with its own internal logic and 
structure, competition becomes an ‘historical objective of governmental art’, 
the object of economic regulation.27 This implicates a new set of relations 
between the individual and the economic order – for example, the 
individualisation of the wage relationship gives effect to the permeation of 
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competition among individuals and within the individual himself.28 
Arguably, this corresponds to a generic process of the production of neo-
liberal subjectivity, involving the ‘incorporation of all subjective potential, 
the capacity to communicate, to feel, to create, to think, into productive 
powers for capital’.29 Thus the individual, as a unit of enterprise, is no longer 
merely the legal subject of rules and interdictions, nor is he merely the 
political subject who serves the civic common good; the individual is an 
entrepreneur of himself, whose freedom to act (as his own capital and 
producer) is the very condition for economic activity. In the second place, 
this process of individualisation, far from excluding government 
intervention, requires that government act to implement ‘individual social 
policy’, to ‘intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a 
regulatory role at every moment and every point in society’.30 This would 
then be a much more pervasive interventionism than that implicated in the 
welfare state model since, by contrast with economic government concerned 
primarily with economic laws, the neo-liberal model conceptualises a 
government of society with competition as the regulatory principle. The 
logic of this social policy is premised upon the assumption of an integral 
relationship between competition and inequality, while maintaining a 
vigilant concern for the technologies of individualisation that spur 
competitive conditions: 
The specific role of government is then, on the one hand, to detect 
‘differences’ of status, incomes, education, social insurances, etc., 
and to set these inequalities to act effectively one against the other. 
On the other hand, it is a question of amplifying the politics of 
individualization – of salaries, of careers, of the monitoring of the 
unemployed – inside each segment, each situation, as a way of 
inciting competition.31 
In the third place, as a corollary imperative, the multiplication of enterprises, 
loosed from an over-arching plan and provided with free rein, gives rise to 
the multiplication of environmental effects and of sites of friction and 
disputes, and thus to an increased demand for judicial oversight and 
arbitration. This judicial intervention operates in parallel with an 
increasingly formalised governmental intervention, such that justice 
becomes ‘an omnipresent public service’.32 
The Heterogeneity of Homo Juridicus and Homo Economicus 
The interrelationships between the juridical and economic spheres that we 
have schematically presented above suggest a potentially novel approach to 
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the study of subjectivity. We	   can see at the outset that the concern with 
population in the thinking of the eighteenth century economists has 
important ramifications for the conceptualisation of the subject of human 
rights. Because the population is seen not as a collection of individual 
subjects bound to the government by an impervious juridical bond but as a 
set of natural processes in which a multiplicity of interests take effect, the 
individual within this economic order (homo economicus) is more accurately 
conceived as a subject of interests than a subject of rights. The relationship 
between the subject of rights and the subject of interests is not necessarily 
one of opposition; to the extent that legal structures, such as a contract, may 
be based upon a calculation of interests—in the premise that, ultimately, one 
obeys a contract because it is in one’s interest to do so, since even a sense of 
obligation has a source in self-interest—the subject of interests can be said to 
coexist with and subsist the formation of the subject of rights, with the 
former being irreducible to the latter.33 On the other hand, the two forms of 
subjectivity are governed by different logical models. Where the subject of 
rights is a divided subject, which is to say, divided into one who possesses 
natural, inalienable rights and one who agrees to relinquish rights, the 
subject of interests is not required to relinquish his interests, and instead 
must egoistically pursue such interests, the effect of which is to multiply and 
intensify the interests as each individual’s will harmonises with that of 
others.34 Thus, each has its own distinct relationship to political power. The 
contractual form of relationship between the subject of rights and the 
governing power operates on the principles of certainty, security and the 
totalising nature of sovereign authority. By contrast, the subject of interests 
operates in a world of infinite interests and non-foreseeable accidents, and 
thus he is unable to comprehend the totality of the economic order, even if 
his actions in pursuing his own advantage positively work to produce the 
advantage of others.35 Foucault summarises the significance of this essential 
heterogeneity of subjective forms when he states that: ‘Liberalism acquired 
its modern shape precisely with the formulation of this essential 
incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic 
subjects of interests and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign.’36 	  
What, then, is the place of human rights within this schema? How does 
this thesis on the emergence and dominance of the subject of interests help 
us to understand the prevalence of the human rights discourse in juridical-
political thought, and of human rights as one of the most representative 
products of liberal thinking? It has to be said that even though human rights 
have traditionally taken on the form of inherently and inalienably held legal 
claims against the state, they cannot be subsumed by the figure of the subject 
of rights, at least in the stark and minimalistic way in which it is portrayed 
by Foucault. This is because human rights presuppose more than a 
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contractual, juridical relationship between the individual and the state; they 
depend upon an ontological theory of man, of human being, and of the 
manifold ethical, political and economic relations through which he or she 
derives an identity. If we are to abandon the metaphysical conceptualisation 
of the subject of rights, which in the end – and certainly in a secularised 
context – would present the human being as a purely abstract entity, we need 
to examine how the human being has come to be constructed as a juridical-
economic subject. The juridical-economic subject would not be a subject 
that is somehow jointly bound by both legal and economic relations, as 
though there might be a shared subjective space in which the legal and 
economic spheres function complementarily, but rather one that is not 
entirely constituted by either sets of relations and instead exists in the zone 
of difference between the two. In this sense, the modern subject of human 
rights – which is irreducible both to the subject of rights and the subject of 
interests – exists, as a product of liberal thinking and liberal relations, in the 
fact of their incompatibility, at the intersection of these competing 
mechanisms. The inherent incommensurability between homo juridicus and 
homo economicus suggests a subjective form entirely subsumed by neither 
the negative and determined authority of the juridical will nor the unfettered 
processes organised according to the principle of economic interests. It is 
here that we find the problem of subjectivity as a question of government, 
and of the nature of sovereignty, rather than a purely metaphysical problem.  
Liberal governmentality is concerned with the rationalisation of this 
mediatory subjective space, to render intelligible the relationship between 
subjectivity and sovereignty. As Antonio Negri argues, in talking about the 
state, ‘one is talking about a complex and stratified ontological dimension 
which, internally, comprises a series of levels that from time to time have 
been available for the territorialisation of domination. These segments not 
only make up the state, but are produced and reproduced in subjectivity 
itself.’37 Thus the constitution of the state does not depend upon the 
difference between individual subjects and the sovereign, this difference 
being the condition for individuals entering into political relations as 
contractual agents; rather, it is the production of individual and collective 
subjectivity that gives form to the state, and in turn reproduces subjectivity. 
The liberal enterprise forces into relief competing sovereign forms. On the 
one hand, we have the classical juridical-political problematic of 
sovereignty: to define the state of balance between the sovereign which is at 
the same time both the principle of unity (of the totality of individual rights) 
and the principle of their limitation.38 On the other hand, with liberal 
economics the sovereign is absent – certainly decentred – since the 
sovereign cannot grasp the totality of the economic sphere. Indeed, the 
presumption of invisibility at the core of Adam Smith’s theory of the 
invisible hand, and of its function in providentially guiding the common 
good, suggests that government cannot intervene in the cause of the common 
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interest precisely because it cannot know the mechanisms required to totalise 
the individual interests.39 In short, political economy, functioning as a 
critique of government, attempts to strip the sovereign of essential meaning 
and disconnect him from political reason, or at least disqualify him, instead 
leaving him as an administrative sovereign whose capacity for intervention 
is restricted by the invisibility of economic processes and a lack of mastery 
over the economic field of the market. 
If sovereignty remains plagued by the heterogeneity of the legal and the 
economic, it is arguably through the concept of civil society, as the ‘new 
reality’ or ‘new field of reference’ for the art of government,40 that liberal 
theory attempts to prevent the functionary fracture of sovereignty. Foucault 
equates the discourse on civil society with the attempt to answer the question 
of ‘how to govern, according to the rules of right, a space of sovereignty 
which for good or ill is inhabited by economic subjects’.41 Ferguson’s text, 
Essay on the History of Civil Society, is identified as an exemplary form, 
among the many variants, of the characterisation and analysis of civil society 
that articulates a novel, non-juridical set of relations between the social bond 
and governmental authority. For Ferguson, civil society serves as a 
correlative technology to liberal governmentality, in the sense that its 
objective is its own self-limitation. In the first place, civil society is 
understood as an historical-natural constant, by which is meant that it is the 
very nature of human nature to be social – there is no separation of human 
nature from society, and thus no natural state that is not already social. The 
theoretical and permanent alignment of society with the state of nature 
excludes the possibility that nature could serve as the ontological source of a 
subjective humanism; if there is no pre-social state of nature, then there can 
be no foundation for natural rights that does not already presuppose a 
communion of individuals, thus an extant network of relations that are 
somehow organised according to a set of principles, norms or laws. Second, 
the spontaneity and naturalness of the social bond ensures that individuals 
are bound to one another through a synthesis of interests rather than by 
social pact or the renunciation of natural rights, interests which are not 
necessarily egoistic but instinctual, sentimental, benevolent and sympathetic. 
However, unlike the market – in which the multiplication of economic 
interests draws individuals together without the strictures of territory and 
locality – civil society is communitarian: it is through the community 
(whatever the level – village, city or nation) that the synthesis of the 
individual with the whole takes place.42 Third, the functioning of political 
power in civil society is also spontaneous: contrary to the juridical construct 
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of the social contract, in which the individual surrenders sovereignty and in 
turn is granted constitutional and participatory rights, political power in civil 
society is formed from the very fact of individual differences that produce 
divisions of labour with respect to the processes of collective decision-
making. ‘Consequently, the fact of power precedes the right that establishes, 
justifies, limits, or intensifies it; power already exists before it is regulated, 
delegated, or legally established’, and thus subordination to authority is a 
necessity of society.43 Fourth, to the extent that the social bond and the 
necessary correlate of power appear spontaneously, civil society can be said 
to exist as a stable equilibrium. By the same token, the egoistic pursuit of 
economic self-interest that is the market always threatens to dissolve this 
equilibrium, with the consequence that civil society is subject to perpetual 
transformation – the continual generation of new social relations, new 
economic structures, and thus new forms of government.44 
This analysis of civil society avoids the concern with the origin and 
legitimacy of political power by positing that social relations have always 
existed and power operates from within the interstices of the social bond. 
Thus the problem of political power is that of regulating and limiting power 
‘within a society in which subordination is already at work’.45 Liberalism, 
through its referent of civil society, establishes a rational basis for the 
unified art of government, notwithstanding the fact that those who are 
governed remain subjects of rights as well as economic subjects. ‘Civil 
society represents a de facto economic bond between men, a kind of uniting 
primordial power which exists prior to any juridical or political structure.’46 
Thus liberalism is no more a product of juridical thought than it is a 
consequence of economic analysis. Because it takes the existence of society 
rather than the state as its starting point, its concern is with the necessity of 
government rather than the justification of government as its own end, based 
on a contractual theory of political association. It is in fact from this 
theoretical basis – with civil society as given and in historical transformation 
– that the apparent conflict between civil society and the state is able to 
emerge and take root as the radical moment of liberal politics. At best, 
however, such an analysis only serves to reorient the juridical problem of the 
exercise of power within civil society; ultimately, the question remains: 
‘With its juridical structure and institutional apparatus, what can the state do 
and how can it function in relation to something, society, which is already 
given?’47 More precisely, with the new form of rationality – which is that of 
the governed as economic subjects rather than of the sovereign who 
identifies the rationality of government with himself – it is the task of 
liberalism to define the relations and mechanisms by which government is to 
be modelled so as to give effect to the rational conduct of economic subjects. 
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Locating the subject of human rights in the zone of difference between 
homo juridicus and homo economicus substantially broadens the analytical 
field within which to critique the human rights discourse. From a topological 
view, there is a disavowal of the idea of a fixed and abstract point of 
reference for the relation of right to sovereignty: that of divine right, natural 
law or contract. Instead, governmentality has a more pragmatic mode of 
operation, being concerned with the multiple existential relations through 
which laws, institutional structures and regulatory practices operate. Thus 
governmentality interrogates the ways in which rights, freedoms and liberty 
serve utilitarian and strategic functions that both redefine the role of the state 
and have the effect of divesting sovereignty of its privileged association with 
right. Foucault, in fact, explicitly heralds this approach at the beginning of 
his 1978 lectures, where he states that ‘freedom, both ideology and 
technique of government, should in fact be understood within the mutations 
and transformations of technologies of power’, and that ‘freedom is nothing 
else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security’.48 This 
is to say that the apparatuses of security utilise, depend upon and propagate 
freedoms understood not as exemptions or privileges but as ‘the possibility 
of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people 
and things’.49 These economic freedoms support the apparatuses of security 
in a formative rather than restrictive way: rather than acting in counterpoint 
to the legal-political constraints of sovereignty, they contribute to a social 
reality (of free circulations and economic agents) through which sovereignty 
may be reconstituted. As Jacques Donzelot comments, ‘there is no freedom 
that is not produced, that is not to be constructed, and this construction takes 
place through interventions by the State, not by its mere disengagement’.50 
Thus the presupposed antagonism between the individual and the state 
(between individual rights and sovereign right) under the traditional 
juridical-political conception of rights gives way to a differential, productive 
relationship governed by, on the one hand, the free play of individual 
interests, and on the other, the self-limitation of governmental action. 
This leads to another observation on the nature of state intervention. If 
the modern state is characterised by two heterogenous schemas for 
government – the juridico-deductive and the economic-utilitarian – that do 
not rule out ‘coexistence, conjunction, or connection’,51 the function of 
public law cannot but be affected by the co-application and potential 
intersection of these approaches, whatever form they may take. Public law is 
not necessarily rendered irrelevant by the new governmental rationality, but 
its frame of reference is no longer centred on the sovereign who rules over 
subjects, or even – as with reason of state – of the state as an end in itself. 
Rather, public law must attend to a public sphere that is increasingly 
disparate and pervasive, with institutions and techniques concerned with the 
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maintenance and management of public interests rather than merely 
interdictory rules to constrain social conduct. ‘Law thus, as part of a 
juridico-economic order within the scope of market rationality, acts to 
constitute environments.’52 Given the importance of human rights within the 
framework of public law, there is the imperative to understand how the 
rights discourse reflects or responds to the dynamics of this complex public 
sphere, a space in which freedom plays a critical role, not merely through 
imposing juridical limitations on public power, but also in facilitating 
economic processes (principally under the logic of competition) against the 
ever-present threat of social disunity. 
Human Rights as a Biopolitical Problem 
Inevitably, the foregoing analysis has concentrated on the economic 
dimension of biopolitics as a dominant manifestation of liberal 
governmentality, reflecting particularly Foucault’s preoccupation in the 1979 
lectures. However, the concept of biopolitics has also been utilised, notably 
by Giorgio Agamben, to problematise the nature of sovereignty and the 
sovereign–subject relation, an approach that critiques the juridico-political 
paradigm of human rights, albeit from a different perspective. The separation 
of man and the citizen at the heart of liberalism, and upon which the Marxist 
critique of human rights is premised, opens up a more extensive problematic 
in the sovereignty–subjectivity relation. It is already implicit in Rousseau’s 
work that the presence of a people as political subject – which is to say, 
capable of political expression in the form of a unitary, indivisible force, the 
general will – is rendered possible only by a fundamental contradiction of 
sovereignty. Recalling that, for Rousseau, man’s natural freedom cannot 
simply be alienated, which would amount to renouncing one’s very self, by 
the same token, ‘if the people are one free being, it cannot repudiate its 
freedom (alienate its sovereignty) without repudiating its own being’.53 The 
general will thus correlates the necessity of individual being and the 
possibility of collective being: the will is generalised because it represents 
the essence of the people as a subject, and it is this essence that renders the 
people sovereign rather than merely the aggregate of particular individuals. 
The equation of the people with individual freedom at the heart of 
Rousseau’s social contract thesis betrays a more enduring difficulty than the 
more commonly recognised threat posed by the distinction between the 
people and the government. The subjectivity of the people as sovereign 
cannot but be fractured, indeed multiplied, which in turn undermines the 
viability of a singular political form of sovereignty. This is because the 
sovereign people, as the general will, exist within a process of double 
subjectification: they constitute themselves as subjects in the sense of ‘the 
self-relation of each in the relation of all to the others and as the subjection 
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of all to this relation. But since the relation to self is infinite, the people is 
also infinitely lacking to, or in excess of itself.’54 
It might be suggested, then, that both liberalism and Marxism respond 
to, albeit from opposed poles – and thus are unthinkable without – the 
problem of constituting sovereignty from the starting point of the 
irreducibility of individual and collective subjectivity. In this sense, the 
division of subjectivity proposed by the separation of man and citizen 
returns political theory (conceived as the thinking of the relation of 
constituting power to constituted power) to its original ontological domain. 
The modern political question may be none other than the question of the 
possibility of conceptualising a non-subjective sovereignty or even a non-
sovereign politics, as Nancy hypothesises.55 Whatever the case, human rights 
may be seen as the ultimate consequence of the sovereign contradiction, 
since the subjective relation inherent in the assumption of human freedom is 
inscribed into the juridical-political site of sovereignty. We may argue here, 
along with Giorgio Agamben,56 that the supplanting of the man–citizen 
division with that between naked or bare life and social-political life, by 
which politics becomes ‘biopolitics’, is precisely what is at stake in the 
appearance and hegemony of human rights in modern politics, and what 
remains as both the foundation and limitation of the nation-state. The very 
fiction of the nation-state, that naked human life ‘comes into being 
immediately as nation, so that there may not be any difference between the 
two moments’, thus that naked life is the foundation of the state’s 
sovereignty,57 supports the claim of human rights to invest the citizen as 
political subject with life-preserving, inalienable properties. Human rights 
reify the identification of political life in human life, of the citizen that is 
man, and of the state that is the people, only by reiterating the fiction that 
allows bare life to serve simultaneously as the foundation and vanishing 
point of the nation-state. This biopolitical presupposition of the human rights 
discourse permits the individual human being to be categorised as the true 
sovereign-subject, with all the contradiction inherent in the fact that political 
sovereignty is fundamentally tied to the divisibility of subjectivity and thus 
the impossibility of a subject that is not immediately reducible to its own 
self-relation. 
The link between liberal governmentality and biopolitics that is 
developed through the 1978–79 lectures, while certainly limited in scope by 
Foucault’s selective historiography, nonetheless suggests a theoretical 
perspective within which to understand the emergence of human rights. It is 
feasible to surmise that human rights have played a decisive role in the 
rationalisation of the exercise of government associated with liberalism in its 
concern with population and human life. In this sense, understanding the 
subject of human rights as one of the principal products of liberal 
                                                           
54  Nancy (2007), pp 100–1. 
55  Nancy (2007), p 101 
56  See Agamben (1998, 2000). 
57  Agamben (2000), p 21. 
BUONAMANO: SUBJECTIVITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER FOUCAULT 305 
governmental rationality entails coming to terms with the historical 
processes by which the politicisation and juridification of human life have 
come to dominate as political technologies of the modern state. At the 
threshold of this interrogation lies the fundamental question of whether it is 
possible for the human being to have a political presence without being 
subsumed by the citizen as a juridico-political subject, a question with which 
liberal thought has long struggled. We have in mind here the figure of the 
refugee, which Agamben,58 and Arendt59 before him, held up as the 
quintessential bearer of human rights, in the sense that in its extreme mode 
the refugee eschews all other forms of social identity while demanding the 
protection of rights precisely by virtue of his bare humanity, a paradoxical 
situation in which he is simultaneously subject to and outside of the state’s 
jurisdiction. But there are other manifestations of the current urgency of this 
question. The juridical formulation of social and economic rights, with all 
the inherent problems of definition and justiciability, always threatens to 
unveil the historically contingent structure of human rights as the rights of 
the civilian subject. Similarly, the movement and institutions of 
humanitarianism, maintaining a presence especially where armed conflict 
has rendered the rule of law at its weakest, potentially come into conflict 
with the principle of sovereign right upon which the nation-state claims to be 
founded, and thus with the constitutive rights of the political subject. 
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